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NOTE
Torts-PUNITIVE DAMAGES-THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT Is
ASKED To DECIDE WHETHER PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED
AGAINST A DECEASED TORTFEASOR'S ESTATE-Byrd v. Lohr, 488 So.
2d 138 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)O N MAY 8, 1986, the Florida Supreme Court was asked to de-
cide whether punitive damages may be awarded against the
estate of a deceased tortfeasor. In Byrd v. Lohr,1 the Fifth District
Court of Appeal certified the question to the Florida Supreme
Court as a matter of great public importance. The Fifth District
Court's opinion focuses on the quandary faced by the court when
confronted with compelling public policy arguments against assess-
ing punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate and
dicta from an earlier Florida Supreme Court case2 that suggested
that punitive damage claims survive regardless of the death of a
tortfeasor.
The burden now rests with the Florida Supreme Court to decide
whether Florida should remain one of only four states that allow
plaintiffs to recover punitive damages from the estate of a wrong-
doer who has died.' Just as the Fifth District Court of Appeal
struggled with the question, so too will the Florida Supreme Court
have to grapple with competing precedent and public policy to de-
cide this issue.
The purpose of this Note is to examine the types of cases in
Florida and other states in which punitive damages have been
awarded against deceased tortfeasor's estates. The author discusses
the attendant public policy concerns that likely will be considered
by the Florida Supreme Court, and considers alternatives to grant-
ing such awards.
1. 488 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
2. Atlas Properties, Inc. v. Didich, 226 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1969).
3. Currently, only Texas, West Virginia, Illinois, and Florida allow punitive damages to
be assessed against a deceased tortfeasor's estate. See Texas: Hofer v. Lavender, 679
S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984); West Virginia: Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8 (W. Va. 1982);
Illinois: National Bank v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 73 Ill. 2d 160, 383 N.E.2d 919 (1978); Flor-
ida: Johnson v. Rinesmith, 238 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), cert. denied, 241 So. 2d 857
(Fla. 1970).
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I. BACKGROUND ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive or exemplary damages may be awarded in a civil trial
on a tort action to more than compensate a plaintiff for his inju-
ries.4 The history of punitive damages may be traced back to bibli-
cal times when, according to the Bible, God instructed Moses to
tell the Israelites:
If a thief is caught breaking in and is struck a blow, there is to be
no blood-vengeance for him, but there shall be blood-vengeance
for him if it was after dawn. Full restitution must be made if he
has not the means. He must be sold to pay for what he has stolen.
If the stolen animal is found alive in his possession, ox or donkey
or sheep, he must pay double.5
Punitive damages have also been called exemplary damages or
"smart money," and have been awarded by most courts to punish
the defendant, to deter the defendant and others from engaging in
tortious conduct, and to reimburse the plaintiff for damages such
as the expense of the lawsuit and hurt feelings, which are seldom
elements for which the plaintiff receives compensation.6
The earliest case to use the term "exemplary damages" was
Huckle v. Money,7 in which an English court in 1763 first held that
a jury could return a verdict exceeding the plaintiff's damages.8
Because English juries were composed of townspeople who were
often more knowledgeable about the facts of cases than the judges,
English courts were reluctant to tamper with a jury's award even if
it was of punitive proportions.9
The first American tribunal to recognize a punitive damage
award was a New Jersey court in Coryell v. Colbaugh.1 ° In that
case the court stressed that the damage award should be so dispro-
portionate as to be an example to others. In fact, the court in-
structed the jury not to use an equitable estimate of the plaintiff's
losses as a measure of damages but to assess damages purely for
the sake of example so that future offenders would be deterred.
4. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984); see also Sales &
Cole, Damages: A Relic that has Outlived Its Origins, 34 DEF. L. J. 429, 431 (1985).
5. Exodus 22:2-4.
6. See KEETON, supra note 4.
7. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763) (cited in Sales & Cole, supra note 4,.at 431).
8. See Sales & Cole, supra note 4, at 431.
9. Id. at 431-32.
10. 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791) (cited in Sales & Cole, supra note 4, at 435).
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Because Florida adopted the common law of England as of July
4, 1776, its courts have long had the authority to assess punitive
damages against tortfeasors." Only in recent years, however, have
Florida courts allowed punitive damage awards in survival ac-
tions. 2 The route taken by Florida courts to arrive at this position
was long and circuitous.
In 1828, the Florida Legislature passed its first survival of ac-
tions statute which provided that "[aill actions for personal inju-
ries shall die with the person, to wit: Assault and battery, slander,
false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution; all other actions
shall and may be maintained in the name of the representatives of
the deceased.' 3 When a Florida court first interpreted this stat-
ute, it held that the act left unaltered the common law tenet that a
personal injury cause of action fails to survive the death of the
plaintiff. 4 More than half a century later the Florida Supreme
Court reconstrued the same statute to hold that survival actions
for compensatory damages survive a tortfeasor's death."
Since 1828, the legislature has twice amended the survival stat-
ute, in 1951 and 1967, so that it now provides that "[n]o cause of
action dies with the person. All causes of action survive and may
be commenced, prosecuted and defended in the name of the per-
son prescribed by law."' 6 After the amendment of the statute, it
was but a short step for the Florida Supreme Court to state in
dicta that just as a claim for compensatory damages may survive a
tortfeasor's death, so may a claim for punitive damages live on af-
ter a wrongdoer dies.'
II. BYRD v. LOHR
Although Florida courts have long allowed punitive damages to
be assessed against tortfeasors,18 not until 1969 did a Florida ap-
pellate court hold that punitive damages could be assessed against
11. See FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1983).
12. See Johnson v. Rinesmith, 238 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), cert. denied, 241 So.
2d 857 (Fla. 1970) (holding that punitive damages may be awarded against a deceased
tortfeasor's estate).
13. Atlas Properties, Inc. v. Didich, 226 So. 2d 684, 686 (Fla. 1969) (quoting FLA. REV.
GEN. STAT. § 2571 (1828)).
14. Jacksonville St. Ry. v. Chappel, 22 Fla. 616, 627, 1 So. 10, 16 (1886).
15. Waller v. First Says. & Trust Co., 103 Fla. 1025, 1047, 138 So. 780, 789 (1931).
16. FLA. STAT. § 46.021 (1985).
17. Atlas Properties, Inc. v. Didich, 226 So. 2d 686, 688 (Fla. 1969).
18. FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1983).
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a deceased wrongdoer's estate.1" Since that time Florida district
courts of appeal have twice ruled that deceased tortfeasor's estates
are not safe from such assessments.20
A. The Facts
Hattie Byrd sued the estate of John Lohr for compensatory and
punitive damages for injuries she sustained in an automobile acci-
dent with an intoxicated Lohr, who died of resultant injuries.21 At
trial, Byrd was awarded $31,000 in compensatory damages and
$25,000 in punitive damages. The trial judge granted Lohr's mo-
tion for remittur and reduced the punitive damage award to $9,000
to prevent destruction of the estate's assets. Byrd was given the
option of a new trial in lieu of remittur but chose instead to ap-
peal. The Fifth District Court of Appeal, finding that the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in the amount of the remittur,
affirmed the lower court's decision but certified to the Florida Su-
preme Court the question of whether punitive damages may be
awarded against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor.
B. The Court's Rationale
In Byrd, the Fifth District Court of Appeal carefully outlined
the reasoning that led to its decision. What troubled the court
most was that punitive damages traditionally have been awarded
both to punish the tortfeasor and to deter future tortious con-
duct.22 Neither of these goals may be accomplished directly if the
tortfeasor dies and can neither endure further punishment nor be
deterred from future conduct.23 The court noted that a majority of
states reject awards of punitive damages against the assets of dead
wrongdoers because the death of a tortfeasor obviates the reason
for a punitive award. The court suggested that most states disallow
such punitive awards because it is the heirs of the tortfeasor who
are punished and not the tortfeasor himself, and because the de-
terrent effect of a punitive award is frustrated when the party who
is not the wrongdoer is inflicted with a penalty.
19. Johnson v. Rinesmith, 238 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), cert. denied, 241 So. 2d
857 (Fla. 1970).
20. Byrd v. Lohr, 488 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Stephens v. Rohde, 478 So. 2d 862
(Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
21. Byrd, 488 So. 2d at 138.
22. Id. at 139.
23. Id.
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Despite its reluctance to uphold the trial court's punitive dam-
age award against Lohr's estate, the court stated that it was con-
strained to affirm on the basis of dicta from the Florida Supreme
Court's opinion in Atlas Properties, Inc. v. Didich,4 and case law
precedent from other district courts of appeal.2 5 The court stated
that "despite the compelling arguments that punitive damages
should not be available against a deceased tortfeasor's estate, we
are bound by the reasoning in Atlas Properties to reject those
arguments." 6
III. OTHER FLORIDA CASES
In Atlas Properties,7 a father acting as administrator of his
daughter's estate sued a corporation seeking compensatory and pu-
nitive damages for the death of his daughter who drowned when
her arm was caught in a pool's uncovered filter drain pipe. The
Florida Supreme Court held that under Florida's survival statute28
no cause of action dies with the person. The court examined the
history of the survival statute and held that the father was allowed
to seek any damages his daughter would have been able to recover
in her own name had she lived.29 The court reasoned that the lan-
guage of the survival statute, "[n]o cause of action dies with the
person,"30 was clear and could only be interpreted as allowing re-
covery for punitive damages by a victim's personal representa-
tive.31 Although the court went further and suggested, in dictum,
that punitive damages should be recoverable "regardless of
whether it is the tortfeasor or the injured party who dies, 32 it con-
tradicted that statement by adding that "this logic [supporting a
punitive damage award] is more apposite when it is the injured
party who dies ... rather than the actual torfeasor."33
Just three months after Atlas Properties was decided, the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal relied on that opinion to find that a
24. 226 So. 2d 684, 689 (Fla. 1969).
25. Stephens v. Rohde, 478 So. 2d 862, 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Johnson v. Rinesmith,
238 So. 2d 659, 660 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), cert. denied, 241 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1970).
26. Byrd, 488 So. 2d at 140.
27. 226 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1969).
28. FLA. STAT. § 45.11 (1965) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 46.021 (1985)).
29. Atlas Properties, 226 So. 2d at 688-89.
30. FLA. STAT. § 45.11 (1965).
31. Atlas Properties, 226 So. 2d at 689.
32. Id. at 688.
33. Id.
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claim for punitive damages survives the death of the tortfeasor3 4
In Johnson, the plaintiffs were injured when the car in which they
were riding was in an accident. The tortfeasor did not survive the
crash, and the court held that the plaintiffs could sue his estate for
compensatory as well as punitive damages. The Florida Supreme
Court subsequently denied certiorari.30
In a more recent case, Stephens v. Rohde,3 the First District
Court of Appeal also held that a claim for punitive damages may
be maintained against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor. The
plaintiff in Stephens was hurt in an automobile accident. The de-
fendant driver subsequently died of causes unrelated to the acci-
dent. In its opinion, the First District Court of Appeal noted that
punitive awards against deceased tortfeasors' estates may have
some deterrent effect if potential tortfeasors consider that their
conduct may result in their estates being drained.3
7
IV. THE CASE LAW IN OTHER STATES
Most states do not allow punitive damages to be assessed against
the estate of a deceased tortfeasor.38 The courts in states disallow-
ing such awards reason that a dead tortfeasor cannot be deterred
from future misconduct or be punished further.3 9 Thus the assess-
ment of a punitive award against a deceased tortfeasor's estate un-
justly punishes only the heirs of the estate and thwarts the deter-
rent effect of the award by punishing the innocent.
However Florida, Texas, West Virginia, and Illinois adhere to
the minority rule, allowing punitive damages to be assessed against
a deceased wrongdoer's estate.40 In deciding to follow the minority
rule, the Texas and West Virginia Supreme Courts were faced with
factual situations similar to that in Byrd.4 1
In Hofer v. Lavender,42 June Hofer was driving a car in which
her parents were passengers. The car was struck by a vehicle
driven by Robert Springate, whose blood alcohol level was 0.27%
34. Johnson v. Rinesmith, 238 So. 2d 659, 660 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), cert. denied, 241 So.
2d 857 (Fla. 1970).
35. 241 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1970).
36. 478 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
37. Id. at 863.
38. Byrd v. Lohr, 488 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
39. Id.
40. See cases cited supra note 3.
41. See Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984); Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8
(W. Va. 1982).
42. 679 S.W.2d at 470.
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at the time of the accident. Hofer died a few hours later from inju-
ries received in the accident. Before the case came to trial, Sprin-
gate died of unrelated causes. At trial, the jury awarded the par-
ents $100,000 each in exemplary damages and the estate of the
deceased Hofer $200,000 in exemplary damages. The court of ap-
peals reversed the trial court's decision in part and held that the
Hofers could not recover exemplary damages for themselves or as
representatives of their daughter's estate. In reversing the decision
of the appellate court, the Texas Supreme Court suggested that,
besides punishment, exemplary damages serve the additional pur-
pose of setting an example to deter others."' The court emphasized
that the deterrent value of a punitive damage award against a
wrongdoer is not thwarted by that individual's death but remains
to deter the community at large.
In the West Virginia case of Perry v. Melton," the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals held that the estate of a deceased
tortfeasor can be liable for punitive damages. The plaintiff was
driving his car when he was struck by a car driven by the defend-
ant, who, with a blood alcohol level of 0.19% attempted to pass a
tractor trailer by driving in excess of fifty-five miles per hour in the
right-hand emergency lane. The defendant's car hit a disabled
tractor trailer parked in the emergency lane, flew into the air, and
collided with the plaintiff's car. Both the plaintiff and the defend-
ant were killed. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on pu-
nitive damages, believing that it was against public policy to assess
punitive damages against anyone other than the tortfeasor to be
punished. In its opinion reversing the trial court, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals explained that, "It has long been a part
of our law that a decedent's personal representative can recover
punitive damages in a wrongful death action against a living tort-
feasor. No sufficient justification exists for denying punitive dam-
ages simply because the tort-feasor is dead. '" 5 The court also noted
that punitive damages serve societal functions by deterring others
from engaging in similar conduct and providing additional finan-
cial assistance to those who have suffered from a defendant's
conduct.
43. Id. at 474. The majority noted that other policy considerations are fulfilled by the
award of exemplary damages, such as remuneration to the plaintiff for inconvenience, com-
pensation to the plaintiff for losses too remote to be considered strictly compensatory, and
deterrence of other potential tortfeasors.
44. 299 S.E.2d 8 (W. Va. 1982).
45. Id. at 13.
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The highest courts of West Virginia and Texas relied primarily
on public policy grounds to find that a person's claim for punitive
damages is not extinguished when either his life or that of the
tortfeasor is at an end. Rather than focusing on the traditional
punishment aspect of punitive awards, these courts stressed that
the deterrent effect of a punitive award will live on after the
tortfeasor has expired.
The Illinois Supreme Court in National Bank v. Norfolk &
Western Railway,46 a case much like that decided by the Florida
Supreme Court in Atlas Properties, decided that under the Illinois
Survival Act4 a cause of action for statutory punitive damages
does not die with the death of an individual."8 In National Bank, a
motorist was struck by a train at a railroad crossing and killed.
The administrator of his estate brought suit against the railroad
for compensatory and punitive damages, which were awarded at
trial and upheld on appeal.
By holding that a cause of action survives the death of a party,
the Illinois Supreme Court created a situation in which a lower
court may now rely on the higher court's reasoning to find that an
action for punitive damages may survive a wrongdoer's death. Such
a scenario would be similar to the reliance that the Florida Second
District Court of Appeal in Johnson v. Rinesmith49 placed on the
decision of the Florida Supreme Court in Atlas Properties, Inc. v.
Didich.50
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Punishment and deterrence are the rationales employed most
frequently in jurisdictions that allow recovery of punitive damages
in a civil suit, though a few states also allow punitive awards as
compensation for the plaintiff's hurt feelings and litigation ex-
penses.5' In the case of a punitive award against a deceased
tortfeasor's estate, because the tortfeasor himself can no longer be
punished or deterred, the question becomes whether the award was
given to appease the emotions of the wronged plaintiff or to deter
46. 73 Ill. 2d 160, 383 N.E.2d 919 (1978).
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, para. 27-6 (1977).
48. National Bank, 73 Ill. 2d at 174, 383 N.E.2d at 924 (the survival act itself did not
authorize an award of punitive damages without an independent statutory basis for such an
award).
49. 238 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), cert. denied, 241 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1970).
50. 226 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1969).
51. KEETON, supra note 4, at 9.
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the conduct of potential wrongdoers. In Florida, where punitive
damages are imposed to punish the defendant and to deter
others, 52 the issue becomes whether a punitive damage award
against a deceased tortfeasor's estate will deter other potential
tortfeasors.
A. Deterrence as Justification
In Stephens v. Rohde, the First District Court of Appeal stated
that punitive damage awards may deter future wrongdoing if a po-
tential tortfeasor realizes that punitive damages may be assessed
against his estate should he die as a result of his own tortious con-
duct.53 However, in a case like Byrd which involves tortious behav-
ior which is also criminally sanctioned, it is unlikely that the threat
of punitive damages will do more than criminal sanctions to deter
the driver's behavior. At least two commentators, working to-
gether, have asserted that people generally are more aware and
mindful of criminal sanctions than of the concept of punitive
damages.54
In Byrd v. Lohr, the Fifth District Court of Appeal suggested
that when punishment is inflicted on innocent heirs any deterrent
effect is frustrated because "general deterrence logically depends
upon the perception of punishment suffered by the wrongdoer. '55
In Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, the Florida Supreme
Court held that an employer may not be held vicariously liable for
punitive damages under the doctrine of respondeat superior unless
there was some fault on the part of the employer. 56 The court sug-
gested that the public policy rationales of deterrence and punish-
ment are not served by imposing liability for punitive damages
when the employer is not at fault. The same reasoning should ap-
ply in cases in which punitive damages are sought against a de-
ceased tortfeasor's estate because the punitive award is exacted
from the innocent heirs.
Deterrence of individuals or entities other than the tortfeasor as
a rationale for punitive awards is satisfied only when the tortfeasor
outlives his or her misconduct. In Campbell v. Government Em-
ployees Insurance Co., the Florida Supreme Court allowed a plain-
52. Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. 1981).
53. 478 So. 2d 862, 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
54. J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE § 2.09 (1984).
55. 488 So. 2d at 139.
56. 393 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. 1981).
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tiff to recover punitive damages against an insurance company that
acted in bad faith in failing to settle his claim within policy lim-
its. 7 This award put other insurance companies on notice as to the
consequences of bad faith in settling claims, and it also served as a
deterrent to the insurer saddled with the punitive award. Thus the
actual wrongdoer was deterred and punished.
A factor which becomes relevant in intoxicated driver cases is
that the driver may be an alcoholic and unable to control himself
or modify his behavior because of his disease.58 A punitive damage
award is not an effective deterrent to such individuals because it is
improbable that they can be motivated by the threat of an
assessment.
In the 1976 case of Ingram v. Pettit, the Florida Supreme Court
held "that the voluntary act of driving 'while intoxicated' evinces,
without more, a sufficiently reckless attitude for a jury to be asked
to provide an award of punitive damages if it determines liability
exists for compensatory damages." 59 By focusing on the tortfeasor's
conduct without regard for his state of mind, the court imposed
what was practically a strict liability rule for punitive damages in
cases involving drunk drivers. Ironically, the court's description of
intoxicated drivers as being reckless people against whom puni-
tives should be assessed points out how implausible it is that these
same people will be deterred from wrongdoing.
B. To Insure or Not to Insure
The question of whether to assess punitive damages brings with
it the question of whether to allow potential defendants to insure
against punitive awards. 0 Public policy considerations indicate
that to allow punitive awards to be covered by liability insurance
only thwarts the punishment rationale behind punitive damages by
insulating the tortfeasor from the consequences of his act and
shifting the punishment to the insurer."'
The case of Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty 8
underscores the point that insurance coverage neutralizes the de-
terrent effect of punitive damages. In McNulty, the plaintiff was
injured when his car was hit by a vehicle driven by the intoxicated
57. 306 So. 2d 525, 527 (Fla, 1974).
58. Geller, Alcoholism: The Medical Viewpoint, 56 N.Y. ST. B.J.. 26 (1984).
59. 340 So. 2d 922, 924 (Fla. 1976).
60. KEETON, supra note 4, at 13.
61. Id.
62. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
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defendant. The plaintiff sued and obtained a verdict for $37,500 in
compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
granted summary judgment for the plaintiff. The court of appeals
reversed, finding that even if the insurance contract could be con-
strued to provide coverage for punitive awards, to allow such cov-
erage would contravene public policy.
The McNulty court also noted that when a person is able to
purchase insurance coverage against a punitive damage award he is
free to engage in tortious conduct which is otherwise proscribed.13
The court reasoned that to hold that insurance policies may cover
punitive damage awards would be tantamount to shifting the fi-
nancial burden for a tortfeasor's conduct to the public in the form
of higher insurance premiums. Thus, the general public and not
the tortfeasor would be punished. If punitive damages are allowed
in a case like Byrd, in which the tortfeasor did not outlive his tor-
tious conduct, then the estate should not be protected by liability
insurance as this would result in higher insurance premiums for
the general public. The only parties penalized by the punitive
damage award would be the innocent heirs.
VI. RECENT FLORIDA LEGISLATION
The 1986 Florida Legislature passed the Tort Reform and Insur-
ance Act 4 to mitigate the difficulties Florida citizens face when
they seek liability insurance. The legislature realized that a failure
to impose limits on punitive damage awards would exacerbate the
liability insurance crises in Florida, possibly resulting in citizens
being unable to afford liability insurance, or injured persons being
unable to recover for damages in a civil suit." The Act places a
number of strictures on punitive damage awards to lessen their im-
pact on the public's purse;6 however, the act does not prohibit pu-
nitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate.
The Act limits the discovery of financial information about a de-
fendant so that sensitive personal financial information and in-
flammatory information are not subject to discovery. The Act
also places a cap on punitive awards, requiring that they not ex-
63. Id. at 440.
64. Ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 695.
65. Id.
66. Fort, Granger, Polston, & Wilkes, Florida's Tort Reform: Response to a Persistent
Problem, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 505, 545 (1986).
67. Id. at 545-46.
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ceed three times the actual damages awarded in a civil action
based on negligence, strict liability, products liability, professional
liability, or breach of warranty in which willful, wanton, or gross
misconduct is involved."
Further, the Act provides that while 40% of a punitive damage
award may be paid to the plaintiff, the remaining 60% must be
paid into the General Revenue Fund or into the Public Medical
Assistance Trust Fund in the case of a personal injury or wrongful
death suit."9 Attorneys' contingency fees are to be based on the
40% of the punitive award the plaintiff actually receives, not the
entire amount of the award. °
Florida public policy discourages liability coverage for punitive
awards.7 1 The threat of such awards through vicarious liability is a
factor in rising insurance premiums. 7 Though the 1986 Legislature
did not address the issue, the prevailing rule nationwide is that
without an explicit provision denying coverage for punitive awards
an insured is protected from vicarious liability but is not insured
for his own misconduct.73
By limiting the size of punitive damage awards and the types of
cases in which they may be awarded, the Florida Legislature has
attempted to contain the spreading costs of insurance premiums.
Thus the Tort Insurance Reform Act of 1986 attempts to limit a
plaintiff's windfall and the resulting public expense.7 4
Though portions of the Tort Reform and Insurance Act have
been adjudicated unconstitutional, the Florida Supreme Court has
held constitutional those sections limiting the size of punitive dam-
age awards.7 5 In Smith v. Department of Insurance, the court ap-
proved of the trial judge's statement that the legislature has au-
thority to limit or abolish punitive damages.7 6 Thus the legislature
has the authority to regulate punitive damage awards against de-
ceased torfeasors' estates. If the Florida Supreme Court upholds
the punitive damage award in Byrd under the rationale of deter-
68. Ch. 86-160, § 52, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 749 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.73).
69. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.73(2)).
70. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.73(4)).
71. Fort, Granger, Polston, & Wilkes, supra note 66, at 522.
72. See Sales & Cole, supra note 4, at 463.
73. KEETON, supra note 4, at § 1, at 13; see also Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith,
393 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. 1981).
74. See Fort, Granger, Polston, & Wilkes, supra note 66, at 545.
75. Smith v. Department of Insurance, 12 Fla. L.W. 189, 193 (Fla. April 24, 1987).
76. Id. at 195-96 n.10.
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rence or punishment, then the legislature should enact a statute
prohibiting such awards.
VII. CONCLUSION
Byrd brings before the Florida Supreme Court the critical ques-
tion of whether the estate of a deceased wrongdoer may have puni-
tive damages assessed against it. Traditionally, Florida courts have
allowed punitive damages to be assessed in cases where a punitive
award will deter future tortious conduct or punish a wrongdoer.
Neither of these goals is furthered by a punitive award in the case
of Byrd where the tortfeasor cannot be punished beyond his death.
Nor is a punitive sanction like that in Byrd likely to deter others
from wrong conduct if they are unaware that the sanction exists or
are unable to control or modify their conduct. If the Florida Su-
preme Court permits a punitive damage award in Byrd, then the
court should buttress its holding with a justification more cogent
than either punishment or deterrence. Not only will these ratio-
nales not support a punitive award against a deceased tortfeasor's
estate, they will only serve as a disguise for the court's real reasons
for granting an award that saddles innocent heirs with an unjust
penalty and the public with higher insurance premiums.
Diane Wagner Carr
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